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I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), refers
to an integrated domain of matter, including ideas and utilitarian or
functional applications of those ideas, rather than a list of discrete
items barred from copyright protection. The menu command hierar-
chy of Lotus 1-2-3 constitutes a function which falls within the latter
portion of this integrated domain, and it must therefore be denied
copyright protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
This friend of the court brief is submitted to support the decision
of the First Circuit Court of Appeals which correctly excluded a com-
puter program command hierarchy from copyright protection pursuant
to Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
The menu command hierarchy in this case represents the set and
sequence of commands necessary to make the particular program per-
form tasks that its human operator has set out for it.'
II. SECTION 102(B) EXCLUDES IDEAS AND PREDOMINANTLY
UTILITARIAN ELEMENTS FROM COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Section 102(b) states its exclusion from copyright in clear and
direct terms: copyright protection does not extend to ideas, proce-
dures, processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts, principles,
or discoveries.
Section 102(b) denotes two related types of matter, combined
into an integrated realm which is excluded from copyright, rather than
a listing of discrete topics of non-copyrightable subject matter. "Pro-
cedure," "process," "system," and "method" are synonyms or convey
similar meanings;2 "discovery" conveys the idea of obtaining "knowl-
edge of, as through study."3 All four words are also used to mean
patentable subject matter.4 While dictionaries provide different spe-
cific meanings to "idea," "concept," and "principle," all three words
1. "Borland did not copy any of Lotus's underlying computer code; it copied only the
words and structure of Lotus's menu command hierarchy." Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l,
Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 810 (1st Cir. 1995).
2. Synonyms for "process" include "method" and "procedure"; for "method" include
"procedure." "process." "system." MARC McCUTCIEON, RooGr's SUPERTHESAURuS 321, 403
(1995) [hereinafter RooET's].
3. THE AMEiCAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 396 (3rd ed. 1993) [hereinafter
DiCnoNARY].
4. See infra text accompanying notes 11 and 12.
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contain a deep common thread in that they denote thoughts at a high
level of abstraction or generality.'
Section 102(b) is an instance where the words support each other.
"It is a familiar principle of statutory construction that words grouped
in a list should be given related meaning."6
The legislative history of Section 102 confirms that Congress in-
tended to exclude a general sphere of matters. In explaining the sec-
tion, the House Report stated:
Copyright does not preclude others from using the ideas or infor-
mation revealed by the author's work. It pertains to the literary,
musical, graphic, or artistic form in which the author expressed in-
tellectual concepts....
Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer
programs should extend protection to the methodology or processes
adopted by the programmer, rather than merely to the "writing"
expressing his ideas. Section 102(b) is intended, among other
things, to make clear that the expression adopted by the program-
mer is the copyrightable element in a computer program, and that
the actual processes or methods embodied in the program are not
within the scope of the copyright law.
Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the scope of
copyright protection under the present law. Its purpose is to re-
state, in the context of the new single Federal system of copyright,
that the basic dichotomy between expression and idea remains
unchanged.7
The quoted paragraphs point to a general concept that separates
protectable from unprotectable matters. Protectable matter is the form
in which one has "expressed intellectual concepts." On the other
hand, ideas and strictly utilitarian applications of those ideas must re-
main outside the realm of protection.
The report also emphasizes that while computer programs may
obtain copyright protection, they must remain subject to the same line
of exclusion as other works. Congress addressed the concern that
computer program copyrights would extend protection to the program-
5. Indeed, Roget's lists "concepe' as a synonym for "idea." RoGer's, supra note 2, at
261. The word "concept" may denote or connote a certain tinge or variety of idea: "a general
idea derived or inferred from specific instances or occurrences." DIcrIONARY, supra note 3, at
288. A Ninth Circuit case notes "concept!' and "idea" are synonyms in Section 102(b). Olson v.
Nat'l Broadcasting Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 1446, 1451 n.4 (9th Cir. 1988).
6. Third Nat'l. Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd., 432 U.S. 312, 322 (1977). The principle
is also known by its Latin maxim, noscitur a sociis. See also Texas & New Orleans R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 568 (1930).
7. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56-57 (1976). reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670 [hereinafter House Report] (emphasis added).
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mer's methodology or processes by reaffirming the rejection of pro-
tecting ideas in themselves. Because a computer program functions,
in addition to representing expression, it presents more of a risk that
its utilitarian ideas, its "methodologies or processes," might gain pro-
tection.8 Section 102(b) assures that this will not happen.
A. Section 102(b) Excludes Ideas from Copyright Protection
The primary concept of Section 102(b) is that broad ideas, con-
cepts and principles can not gain protection. This concept is firmly
established in the famous Nichols case.9 Ideas in themselves may not
be copyrighted, because they appropriate far more than a particular
expression. The ideas "love" and "freedom" are amongst the most
expressive of human concepts. One can express these ideas in a huge
number of different ways, yet the core ideas themselves cannot be held
by copyright. Similarly, the general idea of organizing commands in a
graphical menu is not protectable.
B. Section 102(b) Excludes Utilitarian Elements from
Copyright Protection
A second aspect of Section 102(b) combines with the norm ex-
cluding ideas. This second strand excludes strictly utilitarian or func-
tioning applications of ideas that are properly the subject of patent
law.10 Four of the words used in Section 102(b) specifically relate to
matters that may be the subject of patents. Sections 100(b) and 101 of
the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b) & 101, specifically include
"processes" and "methods." Section 101(a) of the Patent Act also
8. The species of copyright protection that has evolved since Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F. 2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984),
represents a kind of "technological copyright" in that the expression protected actually becomes
implemented in governing the physical processes of a machine. In computer programming the
word "function" has a special meaning. The sentence in the body could also be phrased: "Be-
cause a computer program directs how a computer operates, in addition to representing expres-
sion, it presents more of a risk that its utilitarian ideas."
9. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) ("inhere is a
point ... where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the
use of his 'ideas,' to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended."). See
also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-5 (1991) ("The most
fundamental axiom of copyright law is that '[n]o author may copyright his ideas or the facts he
narrates.' ") (citation omitted).
10. The utilitarian exclusion ties closely to the norm excluding ideas. If one separates the
"utility" strand from the "abstraction/idea" strand in the analysis, the line of demarcation ought
not be too sharply drawn. Section 102(b) excludes protection of abstraction and, especially,
those matters that are utilitarian abstractions. A definition of method denotes a general means of
doing something: "A means or manner of procedure, esp. a regular and systematic way of ac-
complishing something." DicTnoNARY, supra note 3, at 857.
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uses "discovery" as a synonym for "invention."'" Furthermore, a
"concept" once reduced to practice and applied in a concrete way con-
stitutes patentable subject matter. 2 As stated by the Federal Circuit:
"Thus, patent and copyright laws protect distinct aspects of a com-
puter program. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879). Title
35 protects the process or method; Title 17 protects the expression of
that process or method."13
The legislative history directly affirms the distinction between
the domain of patent law and that of copyright. 4 Patent covers util-
ity.15 Copyright covers nonutilitarian or nonfunctional expressive
matters, with the notable exception of the "technological copyrights"
presented by computer programs. 6
The Copyright Act rejects protection of pure utility or function
most clearly with regard to pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.
These can receive protection under the Act, but only to the extent that
one excludes "their mechanical or utilitarian aspects."' 7 The design of
a "useful article," defined as an article "having an intrinsic utilitarian
function," can be considered a protectable "pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work" only when its pictorial, etc. features "can be identi-
fied separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the
utilitarian aspects of the work."' 8
The House Report indicates that protection was assured for picto-
rial, graphic, and sculptural works embodied in useful articles because
Congress wished to continue protection for works of "applied art"
which had previously been accorded by the decision of the Supreme
Court in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). The report stated that in
adopting the definition of "useful article" it sought "to draw as clear a
11. "The term 'invention' means invention or discovery." 35 U.S.C. § 101(a) (1988).
12. The concept must be reduced to practice so that when described in the patent specifica-
tion it will "enable any person skilled in the are' to practice it. 35 U.S.C. § 112. Priority in
patent claims goes to the one who pursues the process from conception to reduction to practice
with due diligence. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
13. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F. 2d 832, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1992). A
patent application which fails to reduce a concept to practice runs afoul of the principle that an
idea alone may not be patented. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). Neither
copyright nor patent protects ideas in the abstract.
14. See supra text accompanying note 7.
15. With the exception of design patents. 35 U.S.C. § 171.
16. See supra note 8. "Architectural works" constitute a special group of particularly utili-
tarian works protected by copyright, but that class does not appear relevant to the present case.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (definition of "architectural work"), § 102(a)(8).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works").
18. Id
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line as possible between copyrightable works of applied art and un-
copyrightable works of industrial design."'"
Under the foregoing analysis, a menu command hierarchy consti-
tutes a strictly functional or utilitarian element that must be denied
protection under Section 102(b).
m'I. COPYRIGHT DoEs NOT EXTEND TO THOSE ASPECTS OF A
COMPUTER INTERFACE WHICH CONSTITUTE THE COMMAND
FUNCTION
According to both the District Court and the Court of Appeals,
"the Lotus developers made some expressive choices in choosing and
arranging the Lotus command terms."20 To illustrate this fact the Dis-
trict Court stated: "The 'Copy' command could be called 'Clone,'
'Ditto,' 'Duplicate,' 'Imitate,' 'Mimic,' 'Replicate,' and 'Reproduce,'
among others."21 The Court of Appeals ruled that nonetheless these
particular choices became part of an entire structure which constituted
a "method of operation."22 This conclusion is correct in that it has
determined that the hierarchy falls within Section 102(b). The com-
mand hierarchy's sole purpose is to channel the precise human steps
necessary to get the program to do its job. In order to use a computer
program, a user must provide the commands that trigger operations
controlled by the computer program itself.23
The Lotus hierarchy, including the names of individual com-
mands, constitutes a pure command function.24 In each case the key
19. House Report, supra note 7, at 55, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5668.
20. The Court of Appeals noted: "Under the district court's reasoning, Lotus's decision to
employ hierarchically arranged command terms to operate its program could not foreclose its
competitors from also employing hierarchically arranged command terms to operate their pro-
grams, but it did foreclose them from employing the specific command terms and arrangement
that Lotus had used." 49 F.3d at 816. The Court of Appeals accepted "the district court's find-
ing that Lotus developers made some expressive choices in choosing and arranging" the com-
mand terms. Id,
21. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203, 217 (D. Mass. 1992). Ex-
pressive identification of commands might well be protected. For example, "quit" might be
expressed by "watermelon," "Kamo" (duck-Japanese), or an image of one punching out at a time
clock. It appears that no such originality of expression is present in this case.
22. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l Inc., 49 F.3rd 807, 815 (Ist Cir. 1995). The portion
of Borland's Quattro Pro program at issue is the "Key Reader," which allows the program to
interpret and perform some Lotus 1-2-3 macros. Id. at 811. In order to do so, the Key Reader
file contains a copy of the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command hierarchy. Id. at 812.
23. The Court of Appeals likened the commands to buttons used to control a VCR. Id. at
817. The authors of this brief have not examined the record, but rely on the construction of facts
set forth in the published opinions for all factual observations.
24. The definition of "command" comports with this observation, but the argument is not a
semantic one. Command means "to direct with authority" or in computer science, "a signal that
initiates an operation defined by an instruction." DICnONARY, supra note 3, at 279.
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sequences input within the framework of the menu command hierar-
chy activate some response in the computer causing it to perform an
operation. The menu command hierarchy, including its specific com-
mands, is merely the tool used to cause the program to operate. Once
utilized by a user to construct a macro (e.g., a series of operations
which can be executed through a single keystroke), its use is critical to
the operation of the macro. The command hierarchy, including the
command terms, thus constitutes pure function. As such, the hierar-
chy must be excluded from copyright by Section 102(b).
Examples from copyright and other branches of law that further
recognize that words sometimes express ideas, while at other times
they constitute action or serve a function, support the division between
words as expression of ideas and the functional use of words. When
this is the case, the law treats the words as something other than mere
expression.
Rules of a game have been held to be not protectable by copy-
right.' The particular way in which the rules are described or ex-
pressed will be narrowly protected, however.26 The menu command
hierarchy presents a similar case. Expression, if any, found within the
command hierarchy should only be protected to the extent of expres-
sive value independent of the command function.27
In other areas, when function overtakes expression, the law rec-
ognizes that the "expressive" or communicative aspect must be treated
differently than when pure expression is involved. For instance, the
words "pay to the order of" endorsed on the back of a check function
to transfer the rights in the check to another.28 In common experience
one acknowledges when function overtakes expression by responding
25. Affiliated Hosp. Prod., Inc. v. Merdel Game Mfg. Co., 513 F. 2d 1183, 1188-89 (2d
Cir. 1975).
26. Id.
27. Intellectual property law has wrestled with the functionlexpression demarcation in a
variety of other areas. We advert to some in this footnote. In Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,
977 F. 2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) the Court rejected a trademark claim where the display of the
mark "S-E-G-A" became a functional aspect of operation of the game itself, stating, that a
"trademark owner may not enjoy a monopoly over the functional use of the mark." Id. at 1531.
The trial court in Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,775 F. Supp. 544, 559-60 (E.D.N.Y.
1991), aff'd in part, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992), emphasized the behavioral aspect of a com-
puter program in distinguishing between the static structure, sequence, and organization of the
computer program, represented by the program's copyrighted text, and the dynamic structure
represented by the program's behavior. The court noted there was no relationship between the
structure of the text (the source and object codes) and the sequence of operations in a program,
which are behavior. Finally, the court stated the program's behavioral aspect fell within the
statutory terms of "process," "system,: and "method of operation" in Section 102(b). The static
versus dynamic structure distinction was referred to approvingly by the Second Circuit in af-
firming the case. lME at 706.
28. U.C.C. § 3-110(l).
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with action rather than words. Giving the military command of "fire"
to a line of armed soldiers acts as the event which triggers the dis-
charge of weapons.2 9 In any other situation in which the imperative
voice is used, the anticipated response is action rather than verbal
expression.
Lotus's organization of command terms into the menu command
hierarchy, may contain expression, but it also serves a utilitarian role,
it commands the program to perform an operation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Section 102(b) requires that a computer menu command hierar-
chy be denied copyright protection. Such a hierarchy as used operates
as a pure command function. Only if the expressive aspect can be
separated from the function of command can that separated aspect
alone be protected by copyright. The menu hierarchy in this case
should accordingly be denied copyright protection.
29. Some words are so imbued with action that they are themselves treated as conduct.
The classic case in First Amendment law is the treatment of "fighting words." These are "per-
sonaIly abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of com-
mon knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 20 (1971). See also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992).
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